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Abstract - Marine mammal behavior and cognition researchers often face a number of challenges, including the 
research subjects’ lack of interest and verbal abilities, as well as choosing a paradigm with appropriate stimuli for 
the subjects’ perceptual and cognitive abilities. Researchers who work with human infants often encounter similar 
challenges when studying infant cognition and have developed strategies to overcome these challenges, including 
using stimuli that capture the infants’ attention, determining what tasks are age-appropriate, and using conditioned 
responses to test discrimination abilities. This paper encourages marine mammal researchers to learn from the 
research paradigms and techniques used in human infant research and alter them appropriately for the intended study 
subjects. The conditioned head-turn response, Violation-of-Expectation paradigm, and the help/hinder paradigm 
have all been used in infant cognition research and show great promise for furthering the current understanding of 
marine mammal behavior and cognition. In addition, studying a subject’s spontaneous behavior can provide 
valuable insight in areas such as problem solving skills, creativity, and individual differences. Care must be taken to 
adapt the paradigms and use stimuli to fit each species’ perceptual abilities. For example, avoiding a task that 
requires color discrimination for species that do not possess color vision or using stimuli that fall within a particular 
species’ hearing range are necessary steps in designing an ecologically valid and informative study. Adapting 
paradigms previously used with human infants can help expand the current understanding of marine mammal 
communication, cognitive abilities, and social behavior. 
 
Keywords – Infant cognition, Marine mammal cognition, Cognition paradigms, Dolphin cognition, Marine mammal 
behavior 
 
 
Cognition research with either human infants or non-human animals can be a challenging 
endeavor. Most of these research subjects have short attention spans, lack verbal abilities, and are simply 
not interested in some of the research paradigms that are commonly used in adult human cognition 
research. The goal of this paper is to discuss how the creative solutions (i.e., looking times and behavioral 
tasks) that are commonly used by human infant cognition researchers to address the challenges of 
studying infant cognition can be applied to non-human animal communication and cognition research 
(Winters, Dubuc, & Higham, 2015). In particular, non-human research may benefit from using 
conditioned responses to certain stimuli, capitalizing on the subjects’ curiosity, choosing the most 
appropriate task for the subjects, and studying the spontaneous behavior of subjects.  
Part of understanding the minds of non-human animals requires learning how animals make sense 
of their world. There is an abundance of information in any given environment and all individuals have 
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limited attentional resources, meaning that they can only focus on and consciously process a finite amount 
of information at one time. Humans and animals learn to direct their attention to more salient and 
biologically important stimuli, such as food sources, conspecifics, and potential threats. The “sensitization 
effect” (Pinske, Hening, Carew, & Kandel, 1973) is one example that attracts individuals’ attention to 
evolutionarily adaptive stimuli or events. The sight of a predator might be a very salient stimulus for an 
individual, and thus, attentional resources would be used to process that stimulus over the sight of a food 
source. Additionally, the individual may become sensitized to a stimulus, such as a predator threat, after 
having been attacked itself or witnessing a conspecific being attacked. With limited attentional resources, 
humans have greater neural activation in brain areas associated with emotional processing while viewing 
fearful faces compared to neutral faces (De Martino, Kalisch, Rees, & Dolan, 2009). Additionally, neural 
activation was correlated with an increase in the correct identification of fearful faces, demonstrating how 
selective attention can benefit an organism.  
Certain information is more important for particular species and individuals in specific contexts. 
For dolphins, sound is a very important sensory modality. Echolocation abilities, for example, are 
particularly crucial in dark and murky waters where vision is not useful (Au, 1993). Because of this, 
auditory feedback from echolocation would be very important for detecting predators or prey in 
conditions of poor visibility; however, in good visibility conditions, a dolphin may devote a greater 
proportion of attentional resources to visually tracking prey or monitoring a calf’s location. Additionally, 
dolphins may devote attentional resources to conspecifics’ whistles to maintain group cohesion in 
conditions with poor visibility (Janik & Slater, 1998). 
The challenging job of the researcher is to ask and investigate questions that reveal how animals 
evaluate their changing environment. While the animals may process some information automatically, 
other information takes effortful processing. The situation is further complicated by the roles that innate 
abilities versus experience play in developing sensory systems and cognitive skills to make sense of the 
world. For example, young dolphin calves must learn to effectively produce and use echolocation and 
whistle vocalizations. Each of these processes may be dependent on different sets of innate abilities, 
prenatal experience, and early postnatal experience (Kuczaj & Winship, 2015).  
 
Communication 
 
 Some of the greatest questions facing cetacean researchers today revolve around deciphering the 
acoustic communication system of whales and dolphins (Janik, 2000; Janik & Sayigh, 2013; Sayigh, 
Esch, Wells, & Janik, 2007). Although this field of study has been persistently increasing over the past 
few decades and advances in technology are aiding in the effort to decode the acoustic behavior of these 
animals (Lammers & Oswald, 2015), there is still a gap in understanding many aspects of cetacean 
communication. Some questions currently being investigated are: What units comprise cetacean 
communication systems? (Lammers & Oswald, 2015); How do young dolphins acquire these units? 
(Kuczaj & Winship, 2015); What are the different processes involved in the recognition and production of 
these units (Cranford, Amundin, & Krysl, 2015)?  
  One of the most controversial topics in language research has been the extent to which human 
language is an innate versus a learned ability (Kuhl, 2000). To answer this question, researchers began 
studying the development of infants’ phoneme recognition abilities (i.e., Altvater-Mackensen & 
Grossman, 2014; Werker & Desjardins, 1995). Phonemes are the smallest unit of human language, and 
each specific language is composed of a subset of the phonemes from all known languages. Infants are 
born with the ability to hear and discriminate between phonemes from every language; however, if infants 
are not exposed to phonemes outside their native language by 10 months of age, they are no longer able to 
discriminate between similar phonemes to which they have not been exposed (Werker & Desjardins, 
1995). Though adults can learn phoneme contrasts of non-native languages with practice, some phoneme 
contrasts can be very difficult to learn (Tees & Werker, 1984; Werker & Desjardins, 1995; Werker & 
Tees, 1984). 
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 A conditioned head-turn response paradigm was used in a study investigating phoneme 
discrimination in infants (Werker & Desjardins, 1995). In this paradigm, children were conditioned to 
learn that when a repetitive sound they had been hearing changed to a new sound, a stuffed animal would 
light up and make noise on the side of the room. After infants learned that this event occurred every time 
the sound changed, researchers presented the infants with sounds that were either two English phonemes 
or two Hindi phonemes. While 6- to 8-month-old infants whose native language was English were able to 
discriminate between sets of English phonemes and sets of Hindi phonemes, infants 10 months-of-age 
and older no longer turned their heads when the Hindi phoneme changed. This study and other studies 
(e.g., Pons, Lewkowicz, Soto-Faraco, & Sebastián-Gallés, 2009; Seidl, Cristià, Bernard, & Onishi, 2009) 
support the concept of perceptual narrowing, where experience (or lack of experience) with a particular 
language shapes the perceptual abilities of the developing brain (Maurer & Werker, 2014). Despite the 
prevalent use of this paradigm with infants, it should be noted that the stimuli in this paradigm can be 
interpreted as attention holders and not discriminative stimuli, thus bringing into question the theoretical 
conclusions that have been drawn from experiments using this paradigm (Weitzman, 2007). 
 The conditioned head-turn response is a suitable paradigm to use for infants because it does not 
require a complex understanding of the task and is usually interesting enough to keep the subjects focused 
on the stimuli and motivated to respond. The same aspects of this paradigm could be applied to research 
in cetacean communication and the study of communication development in calves. Not only could one 
use this paradigm to determine the specific units of dolphin acoustic signals, this paradigm also could be 
used to ascertain how young animals begin to discriminate between meaningful differences in 
communication sounds. For example, playback recordings of signature whistles from conspecifics have 
been used to examine long-term memory in dolphins (Bruck, 2013). Playback of whistles could be used 
in a modified head turn paradigm for dolphins in order to determine what units of sound dolphins 
discriminate between, similar to phoneme discrimination in infants. Furthermore, longitudinal studies 
could be conducted to explore how sound discrimination may vary across development in dolphins.  
 An alternative paradigm to test discrimination is to use paddles and train the subjects to touch a 
paddle when they perceive a sound as identical to a target (Harley, 2008). Though this can be a very 
efficient paradigm to use with mature animals that are trained to make this kind of response, young 
animals may not be trained on many behaviors, thus limiting the subject pool to more mature animals. 
Additionally, having to learn a multi-step behavior may place more cognitive demands on the subjects, 
especially if the behavior is non-naturalistic. It is important to consider whether the cognitive demands of 
a testing paradigm interfere with the results of the study. If the task places too many demands on working 
memory capacity or requires complex symbolic representation, one could conclude that the subjects do 
not have a particular capability, when in reality they do.  
 Engaging the subjects’ attention and finding a stimulus or task that motivates them to participate 
are both important aspects of designing an effective study. Stimuli that dolphins might find engaging are 
objects with a positive reinforcement history. For example, toys, fish buckets, or familiar trainers are 
stimuli all likely to capture the attention of the subjects. In studies concerning object permanence, stuffed 
toys and fish buckets have been used as the target object (Jaakkola, Guarino, Rodriguez, Erb, & Trone, 
2010; Singer & Henderson, 2014).  
 
Understanding the Subjects’ Expectations 
 
 Researchers who study infants are well aware that to engage an infant’s attention in a study, the 
stimuli must be attractive to the infant. The conditioned head-turn paradigm employs a stimulus that has 
flashing lights, moves, and makes sounds, so that it is a rewarding experience for the infants to turn 
toward the object at the appropriate time in the experiment. Other studies frequently employ children’s 
toys that are colorful and somewhat familiar to the infant, such as a toy truck or a ball.  
While attractive stimuli can incentivize subjects to pay attention to a particular experiment, 
children’s and animals’ curiosity can also be used to determine what subjects understand about the world. 
Looking-time and search paradigms can be designed to take advantage of a subject’s tendency to be 
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curious about or attentive to a novel or unfamiliar stimulus. If subjects naturally pay attention to 
unfamiliar or incongruent events, observing which types of stimuli or events capture an individual’s 
attention the most reveals information about how that individual perceives and understands the world.  
 The violation of expectations (VOE) paradigm (e.g., Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985) 
compares subject responses, as measured by gaze duration, between events that are congruent with past 
experiences or typical object properties and events that are incongruent with past experiences or object 
properties. For example, infants gaze longer when viewing a ball that appears to have passed through a 
solid barrier or a toy truck that appears to float in mid-air after being pushed off a ledge (Stahl & 
Feigenson, 2015; see Figures 1 and 2). Both of these scenarios support the argument that infants 
understand the solidity property of objects and that objects typically fall when not supported. This type of 
research can reveal at what age different cognitive capacities develop and what cognitive limitations 
might keep infants from fully understanding a particular scenario by making slight modifications in the 
parameters of the experiments. The subject’s differential attention toward an anomalous scenario 
indicates what the subject expected to happen and therefore provides insight into the subject’s 
understanding of the world.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Common paradigm testing infants’ understanding of object solidity. After the ball is rolled down the ramp, the screen is 
moved to reveal either scenario A or B. Scenario A is consistent with the property of object solidity; however, scenario B violates 
the property of solidity. Infants stare longer at the incongruent event as discussed by Stahl and Feigensen (2015). 
 
 Stahl and Feigenson (2015) further expanded on the VOE paradigm by providing the subjects 
with two objects: one that the infants had just witnessed violates an object property and one that the 
infants had just witnessed perform the same action without violating an object property. The infants 
played more with the object that had just behaved incongruently and even performed actions with that 
object to test the object property that was violated in the incongruent event. The infants were also faster to 
learn a new property of the object, such as that the object made noise, if they had previously seen the 
object behave incongruently. This study demonstrates that showing infants an event in which their 
expectations are violated stimulates curiosity and paves the way for hypothesis testing and learning. This 
finding matches Piaget’s (1952) “moderately discrepant event” in which learning is driven by events that 
contain both familiar and unfamiliar components.  
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Figure 2. Common paradigm testing infants’ understanding of support relations. After the truck is pushed off the ramp, it either 
falls to the table (Scenario A) or appears to float in mid-air (Scenario B). Infants stare longer at the incongruent event where the 
truck does not fall when support is removed, as discussed by Stahl and Feigensen (2015). 
 
 Potential issues associated with the looking time preference paradigm, of which the VOE is a 
type, have arisen from studies finding discrepant results with previously published research. For example, 
the results of Baillargeon et al. (1985) have been attributed to the familiarity or novelty of habituation 
events as opposed to object permanence (Bogartz, Shinsky, & Schilling, 2000; Cashon & Cohen, 2000). 
Winters et al. (2015) explained that discrepancies between studies are often the product of over-
interpretation of results and the lack of proper experimental controls. For example, a longer looking time 
for a condition in a VOE paradigm may indicate that the subject detects an inconsistency in an objects’ 
behavior based on past events but may not necessarily have a thorough understanding of the concept of 
object solidity. If these issues are addressed by using proper procedures and not over-interpreting the 
results, the looking time paradigm is a valid methodology and could be useful for comparisons between 
species (Winters et al., 2015).  
 The VOE paradigm has also been used to assess some cognitive abilities in non-human animals, 
as illustrated by the following examples. Lemurs of four different species looked longer at events in 
which the number of objects placed behind a screen was not consistent with how many were revealed 
when the screen was moved (Santos, Barnes, & Mahajan, 2005). A study investigating rooks found that 
the subjects looked longer at an event where an object seemed to be floating in mid-air as opposed to 
when the object was supported by another object (Bird & Emery, 2010). The concept of gravity and 
objects appearing to float would be particularly interesting to examine in marine mammals, as the object 
properties that affect sinking and floating in water are sometimes different than what happens in air. For 
example, ice cubes fall when dropped in air and an unexpected event would be an ice cube appearing to 
float in the air after it is released. In contrast, ice cubes float in water, either remaining on the water’s 
surface or floating up to the surface if released below the surface. The unexpected event in this situation 
would be if the ice were to sink to the bottom of the subjects’ habitat instead of floating. Furthermore, 
dolphins can use echolocation to determine object densities and discriminate between a solid and a hollow 
object, a property which would affect an object’s buoyancy (Au & Turl, 1991). Given this unique ability, 
it is likely that some cetaceans could have different expectations regarding a VOE paradigm than, say, 
terrestrial species would have.  
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The VOE paradigm has already been used to test for the capacity of object permanence in 
dolphins and sea lions (Singer & Henderson, 2014). Animals were shown a bucket similar to those that 
hold food during training sessions. This bucket was then placed on a table and an opaque screen was 
placed in front of it, occluding the object from the subject’s view. In the “possible event” condition the 
screen was rotated 120° without the bucket becoming visible, and in the “impossible event” condition the 
screen was rotated 180°, without the bucket becoming visible. Dolphins and sea lions looked longer at 
events that were incongruent with the concept of object permanence, where the screen would have 
displaced the object while rotating, indicating that individuals of both species have some conception of 
object permanence.  
 A study of this nature with dolphins would first need to assess what events a dolphin finds 
surprising or what events elicit the subjects’ curiosity. Furthermore, behaviors other than gaze duration, 
such as bubble bursts or vocalizations, may be associated with surprise or curiosity and may be produced 
more frequently during events that violate the subjects’ expectations (Clark, Davies, Madigan, Warner, & 
Kuczaj, 2013; Delfour & Aulagnier, 1997; Hill et al., 2011; Pryor, 1990). A surprising event might also 
increase the subjects’ interest in the object that was involved in that event, which could result in further 
exploration or manipulation of those objects. 
 
Choosing an Appropriate Task 
 
Not only is it important to choose stimuli that will help maintain the subjects’ attention, but it is 
also imperative to choose stimuli that do not interfere with the task at hand. For example, infants search 
more for hidden objects when those objects are familiar than if they are unfamiliar (Shinskey & 
Munakata, 2005). Additionally, using a search paradigm results in seemingly conflicting results with a 
looking paradigm (Keen, 2003). Infants stare longer at events that appear to violate object properties of 
solidity, such as in Figure 1 when a ball seems to roll past a wooden divide instead of being stopped by 
the barrier (Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992). In contrast, if given the task of searching 
behind a series of doors for a ball that should be resting against a wooden divide (see Figure 3), young 
children often search at random for the object, not behind the correct door (Berthier, DeBlois, Poirier, 
Novak, & Clifton, 2000).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Older infants are commonly tested with this paradigm where a ball is rolled down the ramp and then children must 
search behind the correct door to find the ball. Though young infants seem to understand object solidity when tested in a looking 
paradigm, older infants often fail to search behind the correct door in the paradigm shown here. The cue of the barrier between 
door B and door C indicates that the ball should be found behind door B; however, infants may ignore this cue, may not have the 
ability to focus on the door and the cue simultaneously, may fail to execute the proper motor action, or may not be able to 
discriminate between the identical doors (Keen, 2003). 
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 The two paradigms listed above demonstrate that infants’ behavior is not always representative of 
their capabilities, but may be more reflective of the task involved. When infants search for a familiar 
object, it might be because they have a stronger mental representation of a familiar object, which makes it 
easier to remember the idea of the object. The second paradigm where toddlers were given the task of 
searching behind wooden doors for the ball also illustrates a dichotomy between what toddlers seem to 
understand while looking at a stimulus versus when they are actively searching for the stimulus. As Keen 
(2003) suggests, this discrepancy may be due to the infants not being able to predict the final location of 
the object versus just recognizing a discrepancy once it has happened. Other explanations are that the 
infants are not able to plan their action to open the correct door, or the infants may have difficulty 
discriminating between the four identical doors. With further study, researchers may find that conflicting 
results also occur when non-human animals are given different tasks. 
Stimuli also should be selected in a way that ensures that the subjects have the sensory abilities to 
observe the events. For example, some species may not view a video of a person in the same way that 
they would a live person in front of them due to several factors (D’Eath, 1998). The flicker fusion rate 
threshold might vary between species, and thus, a video that appears to be continuous to humans may 
look very different for another species. Dolphins have successfully completed behaviors when presented 
with a video of a trainer on a television screen. They are also able to complete this behavior provided with 
only an abstract point-light display (Herman, Morrel-Samuels, & Pack, 1990). Because the dolphins were 
able to recognize the stimulus cue from such limited information, it is unclear if the animals understood 
the representational nature of the human trainers on a screen or were only focused on the hand motions of 
the trainers in the video. A study on self-recognition abilities in dolphins used a television to display 
either a live-feed mirror representation of a dolphin or playback of earlier behavior (Marten & Psarakos, 
1995). The dolphins engaged in more open-mouth behaviors in mirror mode and presented marked parts 
of the body towards the television, indicating that the dolphins were engaging in self-examination rather 
than social behavior (Marten & Psarakos, 1995). This study suggests that the dolphins were seeing an 
accurate representation of themselves on the television screen. Furthermore, a unique touchscreen-like 
device has been created which allows dolphins to select targets using echolocation beams (Amundin et 
al., 2008). Although initial testing of the device used basic shapes as targets, this apparatus holds great 
potential for displaying other visual stimuli for cognitive studies.  
Similarly, not all species are able to discriminate between all colors (D’Eath, 1998). For example, 
dolphins have good vision both above and below water and are sensitive to motion and contrast (Hanke & 
Erdsack, 2015); however, dolphins lack short wavelength sensitive cones and thus lack color vision 
(Fasick, Cronin, Hunt, & Robinson, 1998). This factor can contribute to a misrepresentation of cognitive 
abilities if species are tested with colored visual stimuli that must be differentiated for success on a 
particular task. For example, dolphins are capable of performing matching-to-sample tasks for visual and 
auditory stimuli (Herman, Hovancik, Gory, & Bradshaw, 1989); however, if researchers tried to teach 
subjects a matching-to-sample task with color stimuli, they would fail unless the stimuli differed in some 
other aspect.  
Finally, optimal hearing ranges vary between species which means differences in auditory stimuli 
may not always be perceived as different or as easily distinguishable (Heffner & Heffner, 2007). For 
example, humans have optimal hearing for sounds that range from 250 Hz to 8.1 kHz, while bottlenose 
dolphins have an optimal range from 20 to 70 kHz, illustrating that stimuli of the same frequency might 
be perceived differently by two different species (Hanke & Erdsack, 2015; Heffner & Heffner, 2007).  
 
Social Cognition 
 
 Using a looking or reaching paradigm, researchers who work with human infants also have 
assessed some aspects of infant social cognition, including examining beliefs about the causes of social 
events, characteristics of individuals and social groups, and even moral judgments. For example, infants’ 
sense of fairness was assessed via a looking paradigm where infants witnessed a reward being divided 
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equally or unequally between two individuals (Sloan, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012). Infants at 19- and 
21-months-old looked for a longer duration when the reward was divided unequally.  
 Looking and reaching paradigms also have been used to investigate infants’ preferences for 
others who behave in a positive social manner. For example, social evaluation of others’ behavior was 
demonstrated in 6- and 10-month-old infants in a study where subjects had a looking preference for 
characters who helped another character compared to a character who hindered another character or a 
neutral character (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). Furthermore, infants as young as 3- and 5-months-old 
prefer to look at or reach for a puppet that they witnessed behaving prosocially as opposed to one who 
behaved in an anti-social manner (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011); however, it should be noted that other studies 
have resulted in a failure to replicate this original result (Salvadori et al., 2015). A subsequent study found 
that 16-month-olds tended to match food preferences to others who they have witnessed behave in a 
prosocial or neutral manner, but did not match food preferences of those who behaved in an anti-social 
manner (Hamlin & Wynn, 2012). These studies demonstrate that at a young age, infants are aware of 
others’ social behavior and evaluate others on the basis of social actions.  
Other social animals also may evaluate conspecifics or members of other species on the basis of 
observed behavior. The specific paradigm would need adaptation for each species; however, this basic 
insight into others’ social preferences may possibly inform the current understanding of Theory-of-Mind-
like phenomena in non-human animal species. Objects have been used in previous research with non-
human primates to assess animacy and goal-directedness (Burkart, Kupferberg, Glauser, & van Schaik, 
2011; Kupferberg, Glauser, & Burkart, 2013; Rochat, Serra, Fadiga, & Gallese, 2008; Uller, 2004). More 
recently, the help/hinder and hit/caress paradigm first used with human infants (Premack & Premack, 
1997) was adapted to examine if dolphins attribute dispositional states to moving geometric forms 
(Johnson et al., in press). The results of Johnson et al. supported that dolphins formed a social 
interpretation of the objects’ actions, due to the dolphins’ anticipatory head turns and high arousal 
behaviors toward dyad-specific displays. Given dolphins’ success with this paradigm, future research 
could adapt other paradigms used with human infants to examine, for example, whether observing 
prosocial behavior - in objects, puppets, or even conspecifics - would lead dolphins to show food or toy 
preference-matching.  
Dolphins, and other species of cetaceans, live in complex social groups and exhibit cooperation, 
affiliation, and communication behaviors, which suggest that they may possess advanced social cognition 
(Johnson, 2015). Males in the wild often form coalitions to increase mating opportunities (Connor, 
Heithaus, & Barre, 1999) and dolphins often have complex networks of association with conspecifics 
(Wells, 2003). Furthermore, dolphins have demonstrated recognition of other individuals (King & Janik, 
2013) and a memory for conspecifics’ signature whistles at least 20 years later (Bruck, 2013). Though it 
is clear dolphins are highly social animals, there is plenty of room to expand research on dolphins’ 
understanding of intentionality, social preferences and conformity, and prosociality, for which the 
paradigms used in developmental research could be very useful.  
 
Studying Spontaneous Behavior 
 
 Though many of the studies discussed above involve a predetermined experimental procedure 
with a specific behavior such as gaze or reaching as a dependent measure, research can also capitalize on 
subjects’ spontaneous behavior to study a particular cognitive ability or social behavior. In these cases, 
the dependent variable can be the spontaneous response of the subjects in a given situation. Studies of 
infant cognition have also studied spontaneous behavior in situations of free play or where infants are 
given the option of responding in whatever manner they choose to a set of experimental conditions. For 
example, studies of attachment style frequently employ the “strange situation” which assesses a child’s 
behavior and interactions with a caregiver in an unfamiliar situation (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970). Studying 
the behavior of infants a few days after birth and comparing that to attachment styles at one year of age 
provides insight into how attachment styles develop (Waters, Vaughn, & Egeland, 1980). Other studies 
with infants have focused on child-parent interactions in an effort to understand how children devote their 
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attention to people and objects during interactions with others (e.g., Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). More 
recently, motion tracking and camera equipment have been used to analyze perceptual and motor patterns 
of parents and children in a naturalistic setting as a means of understanding how word learning is 
grounded in the sensorimotor experience (Yu, Smith, & Pereira, 2008).  
 Studying the spontaneous behavior of dolphins can yield important information regarding 
individual development, cognition, and also social behavior. In a study of cross-species social cognition, 
dolphins’ sensitivity to human attention or inattention was assessed by recording their ball tossing 
behavior to human caretakers while the caretakers were either facing towards or away from the dolphin 
tossing the ball (Highfill, Yeater, & Kuczaj, 2016). The results indicated that there are individual 
differences in dolphins’ ball tossing patterns. Depending on whether the human was facing toward or 
away from the subject, dolphins had consistent individual patterns of how hard they would toss the ball to 
the human subject and if they tossed the ball at the human’s head or the human’s body. These results 
suggest that dolphins may assess the attentional state of humans before deciding when or how to toss a 
ball to them. Interpreting the results conservatively, the dolphins in this study were attending to the 
humans’ behavior and were using learned situational cues to guide their ball tossing behavior.  
 Individual differences in dolphins’ problem solving abilities also were examined in a study 
focused on cooperation (Kuczaj, Winship, & Eskelinen, 2015). Two adult males cooperated in solving the 
task; however, one adult female was able to open the apparatus by herself in many different ways. This 
study did not require a trained response and thus allowed the animals to interact with the apparatus and 
conspecifics without the interference of learned behaviors or the direction of a human caretaker. Though 
this study did employ a manmade apparatus, its unstructured trials allowed for insight into the subjects’ 
spontaneous social cooperation preferences and individuals’ flexibility in using multiple problem solving 
strategies.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Previous research in psychology has revealed that infants and non-human animals have more 
diverse cognitive abilities and a greater understanding of the world than was assumed before such studies 
were undertaken. Research assessing non-human animals’ behavior and cognition has revealed that other 
species process information through a wide range of sensory modalities, making their knowledge both 
qualitatively and quantitatively different than humans’ knowledge in a variety of different aspects. The 
challenge of the researcher is to figure out what the subjects know and how this knowledge is acquired. 
Research techniques used with human infants are not automatically transferable to studies with marine 
mammals. Care should be taken to examine a particular cognitive ability using more than one paradigm or 
a paradigm that has been demonstrated to be a valid measure for a particular species or developmental 
stage. Nevertheless, developmental studies with human infants provide valuable insight on different 
techniques that may be beneficial to use with non-verbal organisms, such as marine mammals, given that 
those species also may have limited attention spans and may not fully understand some object properties 
or perceive stimuli in some modalities. In considering these lessons from the human infant research 
literature, marine mammal researchers can further the current understanding of marine mammal behavior 
and cognition. 
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